In the rugged borderlands where the Durand Line separates Pakistan and Afghanistan, a once-unlikely conflict has erupted into open hostility once again. As of February 2026, the two nations—bound by history, ethnicity, and religion—are locked in a cycle of airstrikes, border clashes, and mutual accusations that threaten regional stability.
From sporadic skirmishes to a low-intensity war, Pakistan has launched repeated military operations into Afghan territory in last few months. This confrontation is not merely a border dispute; it is the bitter harvest of Pakistan’s long-standing policy of nurturing Afghan militants, only to be betrayed by the very forces it empowered.
Pakistan’s entanglement with the Afghan Taliban dates back decades. During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, often seen as the “deep state” orchestrating foreign policy, funneled U.S. and Saudi aid to mujahideen fighters, laying the groundwork for the Taliban’s rise in the 1990s. Post-9/11, despite joining the U.S.-led coalition against the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan provided covert sanctuary and support to the groups leadership, viewing them as a bulwark against Indian influence. This “strategic depth” doctrine—envisioning Afghanistan as a friendly rear base in any potential conflict with India—became the cornerstone of Pakistan’s military strategy. Islamabad’s generals believed a Taliban-led government would ensure a pliable neighbor, preventing encirclement by hostile powers.
Yet, this calculus has catastrophically backfired. Since the Taliban’s 2021 takeover of Kabul, relations have soured dramatically. The Afghan Taliban, once Pakistan’s proxies, have refused to rein in the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a splinter group waging a deadly insurgency against Islamabad. The TTP, also known as Fitna al-Khawarij in Pakistani rhetoric, has launched over 1,000 attacks in recent years, killing hundreds of soldiers and civilians. Afghan Taliban leaders, sharing ideological ties with the TTP, have apparently provided safe havens, funding, and even protection in Kabul, however the TTP is just not limited to having safe havens in Afghans, as Islamist militant organizations in Pakistan, sometimes state backed, also facilitate the Pakistani Taliban,
The deep state’s fingerprints are everywhere in this fiasco. The military’s dominance over civilian governments has perpetuated short-sighted policies, ignoring diplomatic avenues in favor of coercion. Failed peace talks, such as those in Istanbul in late 2025, collapsed reportedly due to Pakistani military’s unreasonable demands. And now this new escalation has been marked by Pakistan’s airstrikes, ostensibly targeting TTP hideouts but increasingly drawing international condemnation for civilian casualties.
In December 2025, strikes in Paktika province killed at least 46 people, mostly women and children, according to Afghan and international media reports. More recently, on February 21-22, 2026, Pakistan Air Force jets bombed sites in Nangarhar and Paktika, claiming to eliminate 70 militants. However, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) confirmed credible reports of at least 13 civilian deaths and seven injuries, including children. Afghan officials reported higher tolls: 17-18 civilians in one instance, with homes, madrassas, and mosques damaged. Amnesty International called for independent investigations, highlighting a pattern where precision strikes devolve into indiscriminate violence. International media outlets have documented how these operations rarely hit high-value militants, instead terrorizing border communities and fueling anti-Pakistan sentiment in Afghanistan.
This war’s roots lie squarely in the flawed policies of Pakistan’s military, particularly under Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal Asim Munir. Elevated to unprecedented power through manipulation of civilian politicians and the parliament via constitutional amendments, since his ascension, Munir has adopted a hardline stance, threatening “crushing blows” against Kabul over its support to the Pakistani Taliban, while he faces economic collapse, Baloch insurgency, and political turmoil from Imran Khan’s supporters. Critics therefore argue that Munir’s Afghan adventurism instead of engagement could also be his way to distract the public from his governance failures, rallying nationalist fervor amid rising terrorism and poverty.
