Home Blog Page 13

Alarming Surge of Violence Threatens Balochistan’s Future

A chilling wave of violence is engulfing Balochistan, Pakistan’s beleaguered province, as separatist groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), and Baloch Republican Army (BRAS) unleash a relentless insurgency. In a horrifying escalation, more than 200 lives—mostly security personnel but also innocent civilians—have been snuffed out in the last nine months alone. This escalating crisis threatens to unravel Pakistan’s stability and jeopardize the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), raising urgent questions about the region’s future. The situation demands immediate attention before it spirals further into chaos.
A Terrifying Chronology of Carnage
The insurgency, with roots stretching back to the 1940s, has erupted into a nightmare in 2025. It began ominously on January 16, when BLA and its allies seized control of parts of Balochistan, banning the Pakistani national anthem and flag in schools—a brazen challenge to state authority that sent shockwaves through the region, though casualties were mercifully low.
The bloodshed escalated dramatically on February 1, as BLA stormed military posts in Mangochar, Kalat, setting up checkpoints, launching a levies attack, and detonating a highway blast. The savage assault claimed the lives of 12 soldiers and one levies member. The horror peaked on March 11, when the BLA-Jeeyand faction hijacked the Jaffar Express near Quetta, holding over 400 passengers hostage for 48 agonizing hours. Operation Green Bolan, the military’s desperate response, ended in a gruesome toll: 26-30 hostages, four rescuers, and 33 militants dead, a stark reminder of the escalating stakes.
April brought a relentless barrage of terror. On April 15, an IED in Mastung obliterated three soldiers and injured 18. Two days later, in Kech, a bomb squad member was killed, followed by a grenade attack in Turbat. By April 20, BLA seized a levies post in Hoshab, and on April 25, an IED in Margat slaughtered 10 soldiers. These attacks reveal a terrifying sophistication in the insurgents’ arsenal.
The summer months plunged the region into deeper despair. On July 11, Operation Baam saw BLA target army posts, boasting 18 soldier deaths. Between July 16 and 23, a horrifying wave of ambushes and IEDs in Awaran, Quetta, and Mastung by BLA, BLF, and BRAS killed four majors and approximately five soldiers, with eight more gravely injured. August emerged as the bloodiest month yet. On August 5, a BLA IED in Kardgap killed Major Rizwan and five others. On August 10, a BLA/BRAS ambush in Basima slaughtered nine soldiers, including a captain, and wounded five civilians. Between August 14 and 16, IEDs and gunfire in Zehri claimed 8-10 soldier lives, while an August 22 IED in Kalat killed 13. The month ended in a nightmarish crescendo with a railway bombing on August 25-26, murdering 23 non-Baloch workers and over 10 security personnel, followed by a BRAS IED attack on August 28 in Diz-Parome, Panjgur, which killed 12 soldiers.
Sinister Targets and Desperate Motives
The insurgents’ wrath is aimed squarely at CPEC infrastructure, highways, and government installations, a chilling sign of their determination to sabotage what they decry as exploitative economic projects. The CPEC, a multi-billion-dollar lifeline connecting China’s Xinjiang to the Gwadar Port, is under siege, with separatists warning that it drains Balochistan’s resources and marginalizes its people. Fears loom that Chinese migration tied to CPEC could overwhelm the Baloch population by 2048, igniting a powder keg of ethnic tension.
Beyond economics, the conflict is fueled by a desperate cry for identity and an accusation of federal neglect. Decades of military crackdowns and alleged human rights abuses have stoked the separatists’radical goal of severing Balochistan from Pakistan.
A Dire Warning and a Perilous Future
With over 200 deaths staining 2025, this insurgency is a ticking time bomb for Pakistan’s stability and CPEC’s survival. The military’s heavy-handed response offers little hope, as critics scream that military might alone cannot extinguish the flames of economic and political despair. Media reports plead for urgent dialogue to address the root causes, yet past efforts like the 2009 Aghaz-e-Haqooq reform package have crumbled into irrelevance.
China and the international community watch in horror, their stakes in CPEC hanging by a thread. The insurgents’ growing sophistication — mastering IEDs and ambushes — makes the crisis even more volatile. If this bloodshed continues unchecked, Balochistan’s future hangs in the balance. The relentless push by separatist forces, coupled with the government’s failure to address grievances, could pave the way for the province to break free, emerging as an independent nation—a prospect that terrifies and electrifies the region in equal measure.

VIDEO: Terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba front PMML working with the Pakistan Army for flood relief in the country

A video has surfaced showing the Pakistan Markazi Muslim League (PMML), identified by U.S., Indian and other global intelligence agencies as a front for the banned terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), collaborating with the Pakistan Army in flood relief efforts in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab provinces.
Amid the devastating 2025 floods, which displaced over 760,000 people, PMML/LeT cadres are distributing food, blankets, and medical supplies.
The group is reportedly fundraising through animal hide sales and digital wallets to support these efforts. Critics warn this allows LeT to expand its influence under the guise of charity, raising concerns about state complicity despite Pakistan’s official ban on the group.
LeT’s relief efforts are also a strategic tool to bolster its terror network. By gaining local support through humanitarian work, LeT recruits and radicalizes youth, channeling them into militant activities targeting Indian Kashmir and mainland India.
Past patterns, like post-2010 flood recruitment, show LeT exploiting goodwill to fund and plan attacks, including cross-border infiltrations and bombings, raising alarms about its dual role in charity and terrorism.

Why Suhail Warraich should quit journalism and join the ISPR?

A journalist’s job is to inquire, investigate and question those in power, especially when conducting high-profile interviews, but Suhail Warraich, the Pakistani journalist who recently interviewed the Pakistan Army Chief Field Marshal General Asim Munir, violated this sacred duty and instead used his pen to further military propaganda, in a similar fashion to that of ISPR, the army’s media wing.

To begin with, Warraich calls the responses of the general as clear and transparent, but that is not the case at all. The article is full of euphemisms, and innuendos, for example, the indirect references to Imran Khan vs. Asim Munir fiasco, whereby Munir has referred himself to as God, and Imran Khan as the Satan who refuses to apologize.

Not only is this comparison absurd, but it shows how egoistic General Munir is, and yet Warraich goes on to call him a humble man, who has no ego and glorifies him by being better than political leaders who do not mix with people in such a cordial manner at this private event in Brussels. In reality, the public that was invited to this occasion was very selected and in no way the common overseas Pakistanis, who are predominantly Imran Khan supporters and are at the forefront of leading an international campaign against the current military leadership for unlawfully detaining Khan.

Warraich further glorifies Munir by quoting him of wanting martyrdom, and published this political rhetoric without any journalistic responsibility. Such statements are made to manipulate public sentiment in the name of religion, but Warraich seems to be taking any such statements by the chief on face value, even though we know that the Pakistani military is known for misinforming and disinforming the public.

The interview also makes an attempt to portray Munir as a savior for Pakistan, at a time when thousands of innocent Pakistanis are languishing in secret military prisons, many mainstream political leaders are in civilian jails through manipulation of the country’s top ranking judiciary, and the media is micro-managed to self-censor any critique of the military leadership while it carries out severe human rights abuses in conflict zones like Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the former FATA region.

There are no questions about this or other violations that the military is accused of, and has been found involved in by independent international human rights organizations. Instead Warraich focuses on how Munir is set to bring Pakistan’s economic turnaround, especially through Balochistan, a region rich with precious minerals, but also ridden with decades old conflict that has seen an uptick in recent years.

The general also uses this opportunity to further his anti-India and anti-Afghanistan stance by accusing them of proxy wars in Pakistan, without Warraich countering this the arguments of Pakistan’s well-known proxy war in Kashmir and Afghanistan.

In the end, Warraich concludes by stating that the army chief wants the civilian setup to continue so that Pakistan can stabilize – but at what cost, one must ask.

Today, the defacto head of Pakistan, as this interview also clearly illustrates, is General Asim Munir, who has transformed Pakistan into an authoritarian and oppressive state that uses democracy as a facade. A journalist should question this abusive status-quo rather than hold such criminals in uniform in reverence.

Pakistan Army Chief’s nuclear blackmail on US soil: A dangerous precedent

At an event organized in the United States of America by the overseas Pakistani community for Pakistan’s Field Marshal Asim Munir, reports have emerged that the army chief threatened the world with nuclear blackmail.

“We are a nuclear nation. If we think we are going down, we’ll take half the world down with us,” he said in his address to the Pakistani diaspora in Florida’s Tampa on Saturday, as reported by several global news outlets.

Munir is on an official visit to the US and has engaged in high-level interactions with senior political and military leadership, as well as members of the Pakistani diaspora, the Pakistani Army said in a media statement. Munir said his second visit to the US in just one-and-a-half months marks a new dimension in Pakistan-US relations.

Many have criticized these ties, calling in question how a military chief of the Pakistan Army, known for its links to terror groups, and the widespread human rights abuse can be hosted by the US government, and threaten global destruction.

In Tampa, Munir also reportedly warned that Islamabad would destroy Indian infrastructure if water flow to Pakistan was hit. He said that Islamabad would defend its water rights “at all costs” if India proceeds with dam construction on the Indus river. “We will wait for India to build a dam, and when they do so, we will destroy it,” Munir said, according to a report in Pakistan’s local media. He also said that Kashmir was Pakistan’s “jugular vein”, adding that it was not India’s internal matter but an unresolved international issue.

Munir’s remarks are a reiteration of his anti-India rhetoric and hate speech.

Weeks before the Pahalgam terror attack, he had said that Pakistan would not forget the Kashmir issue, asserting that it was “our jugular vein”.

Two of the Pahalgam terrorists came from Pakistan, as per several media reports.

Reacting to these developments, Indian Ministry of External Affairs Spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said New Delhi’s attention had been drawn to remarks reportedly made by Pakistan’s army chief in the US. He described “nuclear sabre-rattling” as Pakistan’s “stock-in-trade”.

He said the comments reinforced “well-held doubts about the integrity of nuclear command and control in a state where the military is hand-in-glove with terrorist groups”.

Jaiswal added it was “regrettable” that the remarks were made “from the soil of a friendly third country” and reiterated that India “will not give in to nuclear blackmail” and will take “all steps necessary” to protect its national security.

Some commentators have urged Washington to react. “Washington should have reacted much stronger than it did. The fact that it was said on US soil seems to be a calculated insult by the Pakistani Army chief,” said British political commentator and author David Vance, in a report, published this Monday.

Vance expressed frustration over the US tolerance for Pakistan’s behaviour, saying, “I don’t understand why America or President Trump tolerates this. Pakistan seems to think they can say whatever they want on such sensitive issues.”

Bangladesh visa rules relaxed for Pakistanis, sparking security concerns in the region

Amid shifting Bangladesh-Pakistan ties, and growing proximity between the two countries, the interim government has removed the requirement for Pakistani citizens to get a security clearance before applying for a visa.

The clearance requirement was introduced in 2019 amid tensions and broader security measures.

However, this new policy removed such constraints when it was introduced through an announcement by the Security Services Division (SSD) of the Ministry of Home Affairs, on December 2.

This shift came a day before Pakistan’s high commissioner to Bangladesh, Syed Ahmed Maroof, met with Khaleda Zia, the leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in Dhaka on December 3.

This drew attention especially after the Bangladesh government allowed cargo vessel movement directly from Karachi to Chittagong in November.

Zia’s party has historically kept closer ties with Pakistan unlike Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League, who had kept a more pro-India stance. There is growing uncertainty about Bangladesh’s new diplomatic and political outlook as well.

“This signals not a shift but a balancing act by Bangladesh. Bangladeshi officials are persistently stating that they want a friendly relationship with India though India is not reciprocating that. They not only gave refuge to Hasina but politicians are using inflammatory remarks based on half-truth and disinformation on Bangladesh”, Mubashar Hasan, an expert on Bangladesh politics and executive director of the Sydney Policy and Analysis Centre in Australia, told local media.

“So it seems by normalising relationships with India’s arch-rival Pakistan, Bangladesh’s administration is signalling that it is not going to see South Asian politics through [an] Indian prism anymore. Whether in the long run, Bangladesh can continue to afford that remains to be seen as the West-specifically the US-sees South Asia through [an] Indian prism and the US is a vital ally for Bangladesh.”

The security clearance poses serious questions for India’s security, especially in the North East as there are rising concerns that the evolving political landscape in Bangladesh could facilitate extremist groups in the region.

Protesters clash with military in Pakistani city with Chinese-built port.

In the Pakistani city of Gwadar, where a significant Chinese-constructed deep seaport is located, a tense confrontation is unfolding between the military and Baloch demonstrators protesting against reported human rights abuses.

Over the weekend, thousands of individuals, guided by the Baloch Unity Committee (BYC), a movement advocating for ethno-nationalistic rights, gathered in the southwest city for a Baloch National Gathering. Their demands include the return of those who have disappeared under suspicious circumstances and a more substantial role in Chinese-backed initiatives within the resource-rich yet economically disadvantaged Balochistan province.

In a statement Monday, the Pakistani military said one of its personnel was killed when a “violent mob in the garb of Baloch Raji Muchi [Baloch National Gathering] attacked security forces’ personnel.” Pakistani military controls security in Gwadar.

The statement also said 16 other personnel were injured in “unprovoked assaults by violent protesters” and vowed, “those responsible will be brought to justice.”

In a video statement to media, BYC leader Mahrang Baloch said authorities have arrested nearly 1,000 protesters in the last three days in an effort to derail the protest movement.

On Sunday, Baloch and other activists addressed the crowd of protesters in Gwadar that had gathered despite attempts by authorities to block them. The event received virtually no coverage in mainstream media.

BYC later announced the protest would transform into a sit-in, vowing to remain until those prevented from coming to Gwadar to join the protest were given access and all the detained protesters were released.

“Those who are trying to march, they are not letting them go. They are not letting them enter Gwadar,” Sadia Baloch, a unity committee member not related to Mahrang Baloch, told media on Monday from the provincial capital Quetta.

Inaugurated in 2016, the seaport in Gwadar is the flagship project of the multibillion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Known by its acronym CPEC, the project is central to Beijing’s global Belt and Road Initiative.

“Gwadar is being called a game-changer for Pakistan and China, so it was important to tell them and the international media that this land belongs to us,” Sadia Baloch said. “The crackdown shows Baloch are not allowed to enter Gwadar.”

According to BYC, at least one person has died and several were injured as authorities continue to crack down on protesters in Gwadar. At least 14 people were injured in the town of Mastung on Saturday as they attempted to move towards Gwadar.

In many cities and towns, protesters blocked from moving forward also staged sit-ins.

Speaking Monday on the floor of the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan, Chief Minister Sarfraz Bugti accused the demonstrators of engaging in anti-state propaganda and spoiling efforts to bring more Chinese investment.

Bugti and BYC activists have said they are ready to negotiate.

Authorities have suspended internet and cellular services in and around Gwadar since at least Friday, making it difficult for media to ascertain facts independently and to speak to local officials. Amnesty International urged Pakistani authorities Sunday to end the communication blackout.

Authorities have enforced a suspension of internet and cellular services in and near Gwadar since at least Friday, impeding media verification of information and communication with local officials. Amnesty International urged Pakistani authorities on Sunday to end the communication blackout.

Last year, BYC organized a 1,600-kilometer march to Islamabad with families hoping for the safe return of their missing loved ones caught in the conflict between the state and Baloch separatists. Protesters encountered harsh police measures upon their attempt to enter the capital. Despite enduring cold weather for days, demonstrators departed when authorities alerted them to a potential security risk.

As Pakistan deals with a resurgent wave of terrorism lead by Islamist militants and Baloch separatists, the state is struggling to ensure Chinese personnel and projects remain safe.

On Monday, Pakistan’s Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi apprised Zhao Shiren, China’s Consul General in Lahore, of security measures Islamabad is taking to protect Chinese nationals in the country.

Source: VOA

The education system of Balochistan is broken and needs immediate intervention

The education system in Balochistan has all the anomalies in the supply and demand of education that one can think of. Lack of schools, poor infrastructure, gender disparity, high dropouts, and lack of teachers characterize the education system of the largest province of Pakistan. Around 70 percent of children in Balochistan in the primary and secondary school age group are out of school. Though the education system in Pakistan has officially been declared under crisis, with 26 million children out of school, the condition of Balchistan far surpasses the general sorry state of the nation.

Education deprivation is also highly gendered, with around 78 percent of girls out of school compared to 63 percent of boys. In rural Balochistan, the condition is much more alarming, given that less than 2 percent of women are known to be literate.

On the supply side, provisions for education and schooling are practically absent. In terms of infrastructure, the majority of the government schools lack basic access to electricity. The schools do not even have boundary walls, subjecting students to incidences of vandalism, theft, and threat to students’ safety. Moreover, the children going to these schools are bereft of basic amenities like functioning toilets and potable water.

The lack of provisions for girls, like separate toilets or, for that matter, even single-functioning toilets, in the already conservative society of Balochistan further jeopardizes the already bleak scope of girl education. This results in dropping out of a large number of girls in primary classes when they start menstruating.

The region also suffers from excessive teacher absenteeism. Given its troubled political past, many teachers have been killed or were forced to flee away for their lives and security. As per the ASER 2019 report, 28 percent of government schools in Balochistan do not have the required number of teachers. This contributes to overcrowding of classrooms and poorer learning outcomes.

The problem is not only of availability, accessibility, and affordability of education; it also expands to include the quality of education. There are three factors that can be majorly identified for the pathetic condition of the education system in Balochistan. First is patronage politics, which broadly results in faulty planning and resource allocation in education. The merit-based recruitment system has proven to be dysfunctional as the system is run by the politics of special interests. Shortage of trained teachers in Balochistan is a very crucial challenge. Teacher recruitment are often delayed leading to schools sans teachers. And when they are hired, teachers are often under-qualified, leading to further deteriorating education outcomes.

Second, the community has no voice. There are intermediaries between citizens and their elected ‘representatives’, namely tribal lords, religious leaders, and crony capitalists. As per a report, “poverty, tribalism, armed conflict, and a hybrid democracy have effectively dis-empowered citizen voice in Balochistan”. 

Third, there exists no understanding of ‘quality’ education, as rote learning is considered a hallmark of good education. Due to the broken state-citizen relationship, there is virtually no role of citizens in the state’s decisions related to curriculum, which are often outdated.

The condition of education further deteriorated due to constant natural disasters faced by the region, including floods and earthquakes. As and when the school infrastructure got damaged, no swift rehabilitation action was taken. As per independent reports, after the 2022 floods, over 5,500 schools were destroyed, out of which only 50 have been repaired since then. Consequently, students find themselves studying under tents, in make-shift schools, and in scorching heat without any basic amenities.

The supply-side solutions are simple and straightforward and are no rocket science to be understood or executed by the ruling class. The solution lies in expanding investment in school infrastructure, updating curricula, and ensuring transparent hiring of quality teachers. Most importantly, building toilets and potable water facilities in the schools. Though UNICEF & EU are supporting the Balochistan Basic Education Program to bring girls back to school, it is a long journey that requires gradual organic change, breaking the shackles of years of underdevelopment and a conservative mindset. The government needs to take responsibility for the sorry state of affairs in the province and take swift action to provide basic infrastructure for improving its education outcomes. The current generation of Balochistan, denied of capabilities in the field of education, would further push back the goals of human development and sustainable development goals, along with crucial goals of poverty alleviation.

Pakistan’s Entry into SCO: Disaster Recipe for Counter-Terrorism Efforts

2024 marks the 23rd anniversary of the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO is one of Asia’s leading and rapidly growing multilateral forums. It emerged as the successor to the Shanghai Five, a political association driven by China and Russia and accompanied by three former Soviet republics, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In 2017, India and Pakistan joined as full members, and Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and Mongolia were inducted as observer states. With its maiden expansion towards South Asia, the SCO now represents the interests of nearly 45 percent of the world’s population and one-fourth of the global GDP.

After initially being opposed to India’s membership, Beijing later compromised primarily to pave the way for the membership of Pakistan. The change in Beijing’s position was also prompted by the potential for an alliance with India. The ambitious BRI has compelled Beijing to expand its multilateral ties, and the SCO is an important foreign policy tool for this purpose. Pakistan has followed a similar journey to that of India from observer status to full membership of the SCO and for Islamabad this process has been a direct outcome of its durable and strategic partnership with Beijing. Pakistan’s pursuit of SCO membership is both a demonstration of geopolitical and geo-economic concerns and an indication of its foreign policy responses to balance-of-power considerations and growing economic and energy needs.

SCO membership impacts Pakistan’s management of its various alliance partners, in particular its differing relationships with the United States, Russia, and China, and the reconciliation of these nations’ conflicting interests with its own foreign policy goals. The more urgent challenge for Islamabad is the prospect of working with New Delhi under the umbrella of the SCO. India and Pakistan have each made allegations of cross-border terrorism against the other, negatively affecting SCO cooperation on counter-terrorism. Considering this record, the future success of the SCO’s counter-terrorism agenda has become highly questionable.

The inclusion of Pakistan with its “own narrative” about terrorism – has added a further dimension to the SCO’s counter-terrorism agenda. Pakistan has to move forward with its India fixation, especially when addressing important multilateral forums like the SCO. The vast gulf in comprehensive national power between the two nations is clear to all its SCO partners, and their approach would be accordingly framed. Islamabad has no leverage in its SCO membership. It is just being used as a tool by Beijing for its benefit.

China’s continued promotion of BRI (including CPEC) within the framework of SCO would further destabilize the charter of SCO’s stated goals and duties. As a “responsible” SCO member state, Islamabad should come clean in meeting its obligations towards counter-terrorism, especially cross-border terrorism stemming from Pakistani soil.

In a realist interpretation, SCO would be meaningless in fostering cooperation between various states owing to narrowly defined national interests, leading to possible conflicts. Given the continuous exchange of allegations of cross-border terrorism between New Delhi and Islamabad, it may prove difficult for Russia and China to engage both members in meaningful counterterrorism cooperation. Pakistan’s import of its long-standing animosity with India into consensus-driven SCO has significantly diminished the prospects for broader regional cooperation and it has been forcing Beijing and Moscow to choose between them.

Further, the expansion of SCO to embrace Pakistan, has been a source of frustration for Central Asian states. Pak’s entry has diluted the organization’s principal focus on Central Asia proper and introduced new complications and frictions within the grouping, especially between Pakistan and India. Thus, Islamabad’s entry into SCO has made other SCO member states realise finally that its admission has so far proven to a disaster recipe for counter-terrorism efforts in the Eurasian region.

Yet another crisis in Pakistan: This time it is education!

Like the broken tax system, rising inflation, unemployment, frequent episodes of violence, and debilitating health infrastructure, another major sphere of economy and public life where Pakistan’s government has successfully managed to under perform is its education system. The education crisis is such that it is no less than a state of education emergency.

National and international media and experts have been reiterating what has emerged as two stylized facts about Pakistan’s education system. One, 26 million children are out of school (which is a large share of 39 percent of Pakistani children); two, 43 million children in school are not learning as much as they should. Thus, the education system is suffering badly on the fronts of enrollment and learning outcomes due to learning poverty and “decades of deliberate underinvestment and disregard.”

One major culprit is the lack of social provisioning of education in Pakistan. First, the education budget has been shrinking. In 2022, the Pak government spent only 1.9 percent of its GDP on education compared to 2.65 percent in 2015, lying behind other South Asian and sub-Saharan countries, despite being well-versed with the fact that its 26.2 million children are out of school. Second, the lack of investment in the public provisioning of education has paved the way for the privatization of education at a massive pace, making education again accessible only to the rich. Moreover, the quality of the private schools that are springing up in every nook-and-corner of Pakistan is sup-optimal due to untrained, overworked, and underpaid teachers. Substandard learning environments and resources would lead to substandard learning outcomes: there is no rocket science here.

Third, and more interestingly, experts opine that it is not the budget that is the problem but how the budget is spent on education. The education system suffers from severe misspending, which can’t be addressed without reforming the education system. Any increase in the education budget is subjected to leakages through crony capitalism and corruption, making it futile. The problem lies with commission-based construction work contracts of schools, which provide fertile ground for corruption. Moreover, teacher absenteeism and teachers-politicians’ linkages, where political parties are involved in the recruitment of teachers, are rampant across Pakistan. There is a clear patronage politics in which teachers act as political workers for the political parties in return for their recruitment.

The regional disparities are well reflected in access to education as well. Balochistan, with all its underdevelopment and instability, has 65 percent of its children out of school. Moreover, a majority of the 26.2 million children are concentrated in rural areas, and 58 percent of them happened to be females.

If about 39 percent of Pakistani children are not able to access education, it implies a generation of people without basic education to get employment, left to be exploited and subjected to poverty. The impact of a dysfunctional education system is large and prolonged, given that education has larger marginal social benefits (and thereby resulting losses if not corrected). Without sufficient education, youth in Pakistan are not fit to be inducted into the labor market, making them susceptible to placements in militant organizations. This is a larger social loss to society, where the uneducated (or, if at all, poorly educated) youth become a part of social disharmony and a threat to society.

Pakistan also needs to tackle its economic crisis to curb its education crisis. Last year, in May, textbook prices had increased by an alarming 95 percent making education not just inaccessible but also un-affordable for many due to crushing inflation. People in the lowest strata of income across provinces are mostly susceptible to be out-of-school, and in case they get enrolled, they face a higher probability of dropping out, with females bearing the major brunt. Access to education is becoming more inequitable, with rising privatization (making quality education accessible only to the rich) and the poor dropping out and succumbing to the worsening economic conditions.

The system requires swift and multi-dimensional reforms across its length and breadth. Increasing the number of schools, reforming the examination system, which heavily depends on rote learning, reforming curriculum, and better enforcement so that the problem of ghost teachers is eliminated. Moreover, clientelism in teacher recruitment and corruption in commissioning constructions and reparations need to be corrected by making it a more accountable, transparent, and robust monitored system.

There is a need to address both the demand and supply side challenges to the education system, including accessibility and affordability of education, education infrastructure, and regional and gender disparities. As per World Bank experts, learning poverty in Pakistan can be eliminated by focusing on policies tailored to the needs of diverse groups of out-of-school children. This implies that teenage children who have never been to school need to be provided with special assistance instead of being sent to regular schools. Besides, there is a dire need to enhance efficiency and target public expenditure where education outcomes are the poorest. Given the condition of education, children not only need to be brought to school, but they also need to be provided with a congenial learning environment to bridge the learning gaps. However, given the sheer lack of commitment to the reforms and lip service in the name of calling out the rhetoric of a “nationwide education emergency,” it is pertinent to see if the ruling elite would take massive actions to ameliorate the ailing education system and the masses.

Rising Chinese Lending to Pakistan Presents an Acute Debt Trap

Pakistan’s federal government will present the budget for the financial year (FY) 2024-25 in the National Assembly on 12 June 2024. The date June 28 has been set for concluding discussion and approval of the Budget-2024-25

Pakistan’s FY 2023–24 growth rate is hardly 3%, the lowest ever in 77 years since independence. The fiscal deficit between income and expenditure in FY 2023–24 is one of the highest fiscal deficits, i.e., 6%–7% of GDP.

Pakistan’s total domestic and external debt stock rose by 8.6 percent during the first 10 months of this fiscal year (FY24).

Cumulatively, the central government’s total domestic and external debt stock reached Rs 66.083 trillion at the end of April 2024 compared to Rs 60.841 trillion in June 2023, depicting an increase of Rs 5.242 trillion.

The Finance Division has set the dollar value at Rs 295 for the upcoming fiscal year budget, indicating Rs 10 per dollar depreciation in the local currency, as a result the business community is likely to experience additional depreciation in the currency. Unless a significant amount is credited before the State Bank of Pakistan or the dollar price is capped, further depreciation is inevitable due to scheduled debt payments.

The cycle of sovereign debt stress Pakistan is experiencing is not new, it has been a recurring feature of its economy for decades. Pakistan has been paying more in debt repayments for the past twenty years than it receives and yet in that the amount owing has grown 200%.

The current economic situation of Pakistan and the future agenda of the Government indicates that Pakistan has fallen into a debt trap. Public revenue is being spent to pay high interest rates on its foreign loans, leaving no money for public investment in infrastructure and services. As the currency continues to depreciate, the real cost of its debt goes up, credit agencies reduce its ratings and interest rates continue to skyrocket.

Pakistan’s total budget for 2022–23 was estimated at PKR 9,579 billion, of which PKR 1,052.2 billion was allocated for development. In 2021–22, Pakistan had a ranking of 161 on the Human Development Index (HDI). The country was categorized as having “low HDI”.

The country’s debt and liabilities have risen steeply to nearly ninety percent of the size of the economy. Yet the Government has indicated interest in taking on more loans, particularly from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and friendly countries. However, an increased level of external debt can pose a great risk to the fiscal framework of an economy when the current account deficit is high, foreign reserves are at low levels, and the exchange rate is under pressure.

Debt servicing has become an acute problem for Pakistan. In the last 20 years, Pakistan has not only paid external creditors more than it has received from them, the shift in the lending programmes of international financial institutions has resulted in Pakistan’s consumption loans increasing from 7.7 percent in 1990 to 70 percent in the 2000s.

China’s lending to Pakistan has increased from 9.3 percent of Pakistan’s external debt in 2013 to US$ 28.4 billion. Last November a study revealed that two decades of Chinese lending to Pakistan totaled about $21 billion more than previously thought. AidData, a research institute at William and Mary University in the U.S., calculated Pakistan’s cumulative public debt exposure to China at $67.2 billion for the period from 2000 to 2021. That surpasses the $46 billion recorded for the same period in the World Bank’s International Debt Statistics, based on voluntary disclosures from Pakistan.

China’s loans to Pakistan often enter the front door as short-term debts with maturities of 12 months or less, but exit the back door as long-term debts. China subjects Pakistan to a 7.1% interest rate, determined by the six-month Secured Overnight Finance Rate (SOFR) plus an additional 1.715%.

The first goal in development strategy as regards to the taxation policy. Performance of the Pakistani tax managers on this account is highly disappointing, with fiscal deficit remaining high during the last many decades and despite revenue targets fixed annually and subjected to downward revision many a times, yet remained un-achieved.

Amidst this bleak economic situation, concluding his five-day official visit to China from June 4-8 Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif expressed confidence in Pakistan and China’s commitment to carrying out the eight major steps for supporting high-quality Belt and Road cooperation, forging an “upgraded version” of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) by jointly building a growth corridor, a livelihood-enhancing corridor, an innovation corridor, a green corridor and an open corridor.

Sharif’s visit to China comes as the latter’s loan (US$ 100 billion) matures this year. The fact remains that CPEC projects have only exacerbated weakness in Pakistan’s governance and contributed to the already unsustainable debt load of the country.

The current IMF bailout has laid down several conditions on the Pakistani Government, including taxes and subsidies, government spending, interest rates, and the foreign exchange rate . The most stringent condition is to account in detail Chinese financial outlay through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and provide firm assurances that Pakistan will not divert IMF loans to service its China debts.

Last month the IMF Staff Mission held a series of meetings in Pakistan on the next Fund Programme in the form of an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for the next three years.The IMF is testing if the present political dispensation is willing to implement the tough budgetary reform agenda for 2024-25, before a move is made to finalise the three-year EFF.

Washington has reportedly decided to dispatch a Treasury Department delegation to Pakistan to evaluate Islamabad’s economic situation, prospects of IMF’s new program, and general business and investment climate. The debt taken by Pakistan from the IMF has increased in rupee terms due to currency devaluation. Hence, in the long run, the IMF loan has the potential to harm Pakistan and its economy, so unless Pakistan is able to implement wide-ranging reforms on multiple fronts to establish credibility as a borrower with the ability to repay by achieving a sustainable external balance of payments and budgetary position.

The reform agenda will also include other strong measures like privatization and scaling down of losses of State-Owned Enterprises, transfer by the Federal government of functions and projects to the Provincial governments along with the expenditure liabilities, pension reforms, etc. The year, 2024-25, will truly have to be a year of major reforms.

A significant portion — $28.4 billion — of Pakistan’s loans from China are in the energy sector, and as Islamabad struggles to pay off these loans, the fundamental question to be asked is : Will the underlying issues regarding Pakistan’s macroeconomic and fiscal situation be addressed by the current government, or will Pakistan continue to inch towards a financial default?

1...121314...24Page 13 of 24
© @ Copyright South Asia Press (SAP) 2026